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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Ronald Gillette is an inmate at Golden Grove 
Correctional Facility on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Gillette 
filed suit in the District Court for the Virgin Islands alleging 
various constitutional and statutory claims. Most significant to 
this appeal, Gillette moved the District Court to convene a three-
judge court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The District 
Court denied Gillette’s motion, finding that he had not satisfied 
the prerequisites for convening a three-judge court. Before the 
District Court could adjudicate the merits of Gillette’s claims, he 
filed this appeal. Because the District Court’s order denying 
Gillette’s motion for a three-judge court is neither a final order 
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nor subject to any exception to the final judgment rule, we will 
dismiss Gillette’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
I 
A 
Gillette filed his initial complaint in December 2014 and 
amended it in March 2015. The amended complaint alleges 
claims under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971); (3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Gillette claims “he is 
being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment due to the 
failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical and mental 
health treatment, and for being subject to the deplorable 
conditions of Golden Grove, which also violates the ADA.” 
Gillette v. Prosper, 2016 WL 912195, at *1 (D.V.I. Mar. 4, 
2016) (quoting Amended Compl. ¶ 3). 
The amended complaint asserts that Appellees denied 
Gillette adequate medical care, failed to protect inmates, 
provided inadequate training or supervision of prison staff, 
failed to protect Gillette from suicidal action, and violated the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Gillette sought from the District 
Court an order: (1) declaring that the conditions at Golden 
Grove violate the Eighth Amendment, the Virgin Islands Bill of 
Rights (48 U.S.C. § 1561), and the ADA; (2) awarding Gillette 
compensatory damages for the alleged violations of his 
constitutional and statutory rights; and (3) granting injunctive 
relief discharging Gillette from detention or, in the alternative, 
transferring him to another facility that comports with the Eighth 
Amendment, the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, and the ADA. 
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The District Court acknowledged that Gillette’s “claims 
regarding denial of adequate medical care, failure to protect 
from suicidal action, and violations of the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act . . . are particularized in that” they involve 
allegations specific to Gillette “(e.g., [Gillette] has a brain cyst, 
a history of suicidal ideation, and ‘heat-sensitive disabilities’).” 
Gillette, 2016 WL 912195, at *1. Nevertheless, the District 
Court found that Gillette’s remaining claims—“failure to protect 
from attack” and “inadequate training or supervision”—“are 
inextricably intertwined with the [ongoing] litigation between 
the United States and the Virgin Islands regarding the conditions 
of Golden Grove.” Id.; see United States v. Territory of Virgin 
Islands, No. 86-265 (D.V.I.) (the Golden Grove Litigation). 
In the Golden Grove Litigation, initiated in 1986, the 
United States sued “the Government of the Virgin Islands 
pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
(‘CRIPA’), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, alleging that the inmates at 
Golden Grove were being deprived of their constitutional rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.” Gillette, 2016 WL 912195, at 
*1. The parties promptly entered into a consent decree in which 
the Virgin Islands agreed to try to remedy the conditions at 
Golden Grove. After the consent decree was entered, the parties 
continued to litigate the conditions at the prison. “The District 
Court entered several additional orders when the conditions at 
Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan, including a 
1990 Plan of Compliance, a 2003 Stipulated Agreement, a 2007 
Remedial Order, and three additional orders in December 2009, 
February 2010, and December 2010.” United States v. Territory 
of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 2014). In May 
2013, the District Court approved a settlement agreement in the 
Golden Grove Litigation, which called for extensive systemic 
changes in the areas of “safety and supervision,” “medical and 
Case: 16-1662     Document: 003112640953     Page: 4      Date Filed: 06/02/2017
5 
 
mental health care,” “fire and life safety,” and “environmental 
health” and safety. Id. at 518–19 (describing 2013 Order). In 
June 2013, the Court also appointed a Monitor, who “lends 
expertise to the reform effort and provides quarterly reports on 
Golden Grove’s compliance with the [2013 Order].” Gillette, 
2016 WL 912195, at *1. 
Many of Gillette’s allegations in this case track closely 
those raised in the Golden Grove Litigation and the 2013 Order. 
His claims “are also similar to the claims he raised when he 
attempted to intervene in the Golden Grove Litigation.” Id. at 
*2.  In that case, he “argued that he should be permitted to 
intervene because, as a prisoner of Golden Grove, he has a 
cognizable interest in . . . the Golden Grove Litigation.” Id. The 
District Court denied Gillette’s motion, and we affirmed. We 
explained that Gillette’s interests were adequately represented 
by the United States because, “as an inmate of Golden Grove, 
[he was] the ‘exact constituent’ the United States [was] 
attempting to protect.” Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d at 523. We also 
noted the “substantial overlap between [Gillette’s] interests and 
those of the United States.” Id. at 521. 
B 
Soon after filing his amended complaint in this case, 
Gillette filed a motion asking the District Court to convene a 
three-judge panel pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Therein, Gillette claimed that “his 
requested relief to be released from Golden Grove or transferred 
to another facility constitutes a ‘prisoner release order’ under the 
PLRA, which can only be issued by a three-judge court.” 
Gillette, 2016 WL 912195, at *2. The PLRA defines a “prisoner 
release order” as “any order, including a temporary restraining 
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order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or 
effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that 
directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to prison.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). For purposes of deciding Gillette’s 
motion, the District Court assumed, without deciding, that 
Gillette’s “request for a transfer or release . . . falls within the 
statutory definition of a ‘prisoner release order.’” Gillette, 2016 
WL 912195, at *3 n.4.  
 A prisoner release order “shall be entered only by a 
three-judge court in accordance with [28 U.S.C. § 2284].” 18 
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B). To convene a three-judge court, the 
party seeking a prisoner release order must file “materials 
sufficient to demonstrate” that two prerequisites have been 
satisfied. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(C). First, he must show that “a court 
has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has 
failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be 
remedied through the prisoner release order.” Id. 
§ 3626(a)(3)(A)(i). Second, he must demonstrate that “the 
defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with 
the previous court orders.” Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
The District Court found that Gillette had failed to meet 
these two prerequisites. Regarding Counts 1–5 (denial of 
adequate medical care), Counts 16–20 (failure to protect from 
suicidal action), and Counts 21 and 22 (violations of the ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act), the Court found that Gillette did not 
satisfy the first prerequisite. Specifically, it found that Gillette 
failed to show that a prior “order for less intrusive relief . . . has 
failed to remedy the deprivation.” Gillette, 2016 WL 912195, at 
*4. Gillette argued that the previous court orders entered in the 
Golden Grove Litigation were meant to remedy the same 
deprivations that he raised in this case. The District Court 
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disagreed, finding that the 2013 Order in the Golden Grove 
Litigation encompassed “broad, systemic improvements at 
Golden Grove” and not Gillette’s particularized claims. Id. 
The District Court also found that Gillette’s claims for 
failure to protect from attack (Counts 6–10) and inadequate 
training (Counts 11–15) did not meet the second prerequisite for 
convening a three-judge court. As an initial matter, the Court 
found that, “unlike [Gillette’s] allegations of his particular 
medical needs and vulnerability to suicide, these [claims] 
included virtually no facts specific to [Gillette].” Id. at *5. 
Instead, the Court found that these claims concerned “the 
general policies and conditions of Golden Grove” and thus fell 
“within the scope of the 2013 Order.” Id. The District Court also 
found “that the 2013 Order constitute[d] an order for less 
intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of 
Federal rights that [Gillette’s] prisoner release order seeks to 
remedy.” Id. Thus, although these claims satisfied the first 
requirement for convening a three-judge court, they failed to 
satisfy the second requirement because “the defendants have not 
had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the 2013 
Order.” Id. Gillette filed this timely appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. Appellees challenge our jurisdiction, arguing that the 
order appealed from is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
does not fall within any exception to the final judgment rule. 
Appellees are correct. As we shall explain, the District Court’s 
order neither ends the litigation nor prevents Gillette from taking 
an appeal after final judgment. Accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction. 
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 A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.” Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 
F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). The purpose of § 1291 is to “prohibit 
piecemeal review and dispose of what is, for all practical 
purposes, a single controversy in one appeal.” Verzilli v. Flexon, 
Inc., 295 F.3d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 2002). 
III 
A 
Gillette argues that the denial of his motion to convene a 
three-judge court precludes him from securing his release or 
transfer from Golden Grove, and thus “effectively, and 
improperly, terminated the litigation below.” Gillette Br. 5. This 
overstates the effect of the denial of the motion. Contrary to 
Gillette’s claim, the District Court neither ruled on the merits 
nor dismissed any of his claims. Therefore, Gillette’s litigation 
can proceed in the District Court after we dismiss this appeal.  
Moreover, should Gillette prevail on the merits, the 
District Court can order relief to remedy the constitutional 
violations. While the District Court cannot enter a “prisoner 
release order” because such an order may be entered only by a 
three-judge court, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B), the District Court 
can fashion other equitable relief short of a release order. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (authorizing relief “necessary to correct” 
ongoing constitutional violation found by the district court). 
“Under the PLRA, courts retain their authority to adjudicate 
constitutional challenges and grant equitable relief to remedy 
Case: 16-1662     Document: 003112640953     Page: 8      Date Filed: 06/02/2017
9 
 
constitutional violations.” Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 
169 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 1999). 
In support of our jurisdiction, Gillette relies on several 
cases where appellate courts reviewed district court orders 
denying the formation of a three-judge court. Unlike this case, 
however, the orders appealed from in those cases did effectively 
end the litigation. See, e.g., Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. 
Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) (noting that appellate 
court properly rejected jurisdictional challenge where appellant 
“was effectively out of court” (citation omitted)); Hartmann v. 
Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1220 (8th Cir. 1973) (concluding that 
absence of a final judgment did not preclude review of the three-
judge court issue because dismissal of the state defendants 
terminated the litigation “[f]or all practical purposes”). By 
contrast, Gillette’s claims are still pending before the District 
Court and the litigation will proceed after we dismiss the appeal. 
Thus, contrary to Gillette’s argument, the order denying a three-
judge court does not result in “practical finality.” Gillette Br. 8.  
The absence of practical finality in Gillette’s case is 
demonstrated by a similar case in which our sister court 
dismissed a prisoner’s appeal from the denial of a three-judge 
court for lack of jurisdiction. Jensen v. Dole, 677 F.2d 678, 679 
(8th Cir. 1982). As the Eighth Circuit explained: “The district 
court made no ruling respecting Jensen’s claim for declaratory 
relief, nor does the order purport to be a dismissal of the entire 
action. . . . The district court’s denial of Jensen’s request for a 
three-judge court is thus not immediately appealable.” Id. at 680 
(citation omitted)). Likewise here, Gillette’s claims are still 
pending before the District Court. Accordingly, the order 
denying Gillette’s motion is not a final judgment under § 1291. 
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B 
Gillette’s first fallback position is that the collateral order 
doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., vests us 
with jurisdiction. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized 
that there are some issues “too important to be denied review 
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” 
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). An interim decision is appealable if 
it: “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, 
(2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.” Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166, 176 (2003) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and 
citations omitted). “[A] failure to meet any one of the three 
factors renders the doctrine inapplicable as a basis for appeal, no 
matter how compelling the other factors may be.” In re 
Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted). 
Here, neither the second nor the third factor of the Cohen 
test is met. While the issues raised in Gillette’s motion are 
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important,1 they are not completely separate from the merits of 
the underlying action. In fact, the merits of this appeal and the 
merits of Gillette’s underlying case are closely related, as they 
both concern alleged constitutional violations and seek Gillette’s 
release or transfer from Golden Grove. Moreover, the District 
Court’s order is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
                                                 
1 Appellees curiously argue that since Gillette will remain 
incarcerated even after this appeal, this case lacks “that hallmark 
ingredient that courts usually look for when determining 
whether a case is ‘important.’” Appellees Br. 8. Given the nature 
of the constitutional violations alleged by Gillette and 
established by the Golden Grove Litigation, the issues in this 
case are certainly important. See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 
(concluding that defendant’s right to avoid forced medication is 
important). Over the past 30 years, Appellees have struggled 
and, it appears, often failed to maintain a prison that comports 
with the basic requirements of the Eighth Amendment. See 
United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 884 F. Supp. 2d 
399, 404–06 (D.V.I. 2012) (providing a detailed account of 
Golden Grove litigation since 1986, describing Appellees’ 
failure to comply with several court orders and consent decrees, 
and noting Appellees’ “continued inability” to remedy prison 
conditions). Indeed, according to the most recent compliance 
report, Appellees have failed to obtain “Substantial 
Compliance” in 98% of categories in which they are required to 
make progress. Court-Appointed Independent Monitor’s 14th 
Compliance Assessment Report at 8–9, United States v. 
Territory of Virgin Islands, No. 86-265 (D.V.I. Apr. 30, 2017), 
ECF No. 1052 (evaluating compliance pursuant to court order 
(ECF No. 304)). 
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final judgment.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (citation omitted). To be 
unreviewable, “an order must be such that review postponed 
will, in effect, be review denied.” Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 
1252, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, any errors in 
the District Court’s analysis of the PLRA’s three-judge court 
provision remain subject to review through the normal appellate 
process. 
C 
Gillette also contends that appellate review is appropriate 
under the Gillespie doctrine, which permits appellate review in a 
limited number of cases after weighing “the inconvenience and 
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of 
denying justice by delay on the other.” Gillespie v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1964) (citation omitted). We have 
yet to apply this doctrine, but several of our sister courts have 
considered it. See, e.g., Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1279 
(6th Cir. 1991) (finding Rule 60(b) order setting aside judgment 
in voting rights case immediately appealable under both § 1291 
and the Gillespie doctrine); In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, 
1403 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding bankruptcy order appealable under 
Gillespie doctrine because ruling would “advance, and not 
impede, the bankruptcy proceedings”). Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Gillespie. “If 
Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, 
§ 1291 would be stripped of all significance.” Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978). 
In any event, resolution of this appeal is not 
“fundamental to the further conduct of the case,” as is required 
by Gillespie. 379 U.S. at 154. As we noted already, the District 
Court’s order did not decide the merits of the underlying action, 
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and the case will proceed as it would even if this appeal had not 
been filed. Gillette insists that “absent the formation of a three-
judge court, this case will be litigated before a single judge who 
does not have power to issue a legally enforceable order or 
judgment.” Gillette Br. 12. Once again, this is an overstatement. 
Although Gillette is correct that the District Court is powerless 
to enter a prisoner release order, it retains a panoply of other 
powers, both legal and equitable, in its adjudication of Gillette’s 
claims. 
D 
Next, Gillette argues that the District Court’s order is 
immediately appealable because it constituted the refusal of an 
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). He contends that, “[b]y 
denying Gillette’s request for a prisoner release order, the 
District Court refused to grant Gillette his requested injunction.” 
Gillette Br. 13. This is factually inaccurate. The District Court 
did not deny an injunction; it denied a motion to convene a 
three-judge court. Moreover, the denial of Gillette’s motion does 
not impair the District Court from granting equitable relief in the 
future. 
To the extent that Gillette contends the District Court’s 
order had the practical effect of denying his injunction, this 
argument also fails. While an order that has the “practical effect 
of refusing an injunction” can be appealable under § 1292(a)(1), 
an interlocutory appeal lies only if the District Court’s order has 
“serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s], and . . . the order 
can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.” 
Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). While the denial of a three-judge 
court at this stage of the litigation is serious, it is not 
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irreversible. The District Court’s order can be challenged later 
on appeal from a final judgment. 
E 
Finally, Gillette argues that, even if appellate jurisdiction 
is lacking under §§ 1291 and 1292, we should issue a writ of 
mandamus compelling the District Court to convene a three-
judge court because it committed a clear error of law. 
“Mandamus provides a drastic remedy that a court should grant 
only in extraordinary circumstances in response to an act 
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power.” In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). It is only appropriate 
when: (1) the petitioner has “no other adequate means to attain 
the relief” sought; (2) the “right to the issuance of the writ is 
clear and indisputable;” and (3) “the issuing court . . . [is] 
satisfied” in the exercise of its discretion that mandamus “is 
appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 378–79 (citation 
omitted). 
“The first prerequisite—that the petitioner have no other 
adequate means to attain the relief sought—emanates from the 
final judgment rule: mandamus must not be used as a mere 
substitute for appeal.” Id. at 379 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Because Gillette can appeal the District 
Court’s decision regarding the three-judge court after final 
judgment, the extraordinary writ of mandamus is not warranted 
here. 
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* * * 
The District Court’s order is not final under § 1291. Nor 
is it appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the Gillespie 
doctrine, or as an interlocutory order under § 1292(a)(1). 
Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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